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Command Report, GHQ, FEC, UNC, November 1950, together with Annex 1 (Command Report, Office, Chief of Staff, GHQ, FEC), Annex 4 (G3 Section, Part I), is forwarded for disposition in accordance with AR 345-105.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3:

- 3 Incls
1. Comd Rpt, GHQ, FEC, Nov 50
 2. Annex 1 - OCOFS, GHQ, FEC, 1-30 Nov 50
 3. Annex 4 - G3 Sec, Part I
- D. A. D. OGDEN, Brig Gen, USC
Chief, Organization & Training Division

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1. Comd Rpt, GHQ,
FEC, Nov 50
2. Annex 1 - OCOFS,
GHQ, FEC, 1-30 Nov 50
3. Annex 4 - G3 Sec, Part I

D. A. D. OGDEN, Brig Gen, GSC
Chief, Organization & Training Division

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
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COMMAND REPORT
NOVEMBER
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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS AND FAR EAST COMMAND
APO 500

31 March 1951

This Command Report, prepared in accordance with instructions contained in Army Regulation 345-105, 3 October 1950, is an over-all coverage from a Headquarters viewpoint of activities within the General Headquarters, Far East Command and United Nations Command zone of responsibility during the period 1 - 30 November 1950.

Classification of this report conforms to the security requirements set forth in Army Regulation 380-5, 15 November 1949. The over-all narrative report and certain of the supporting documents are classified "Top Secret" in order to include pertinent material relating to hostilities in Korea. An expiration date, providing for downgrading or declassification, is held in abeyance.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL MACARTHUR:

DOYLE C. HICKEY
Major General, General Staff Corps
Acting Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:




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COMBAND REPORT
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMBAND
UNITED NATIONS COMBAND
November 1950

Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

General Headquarters, Far East Command and United Nations Command (GHQ, FEC/UNC) continued during November the variety of assignments connected with the occupation of Japan, military government of Okinawa, prosecution of the war in Korea and other matters within its zone of responsibility. Emphasis remained on Korea, with activities of all staff sections geared to handle the rapidly changing battle situation which shifted from successful advance against a defeated foe to bitter withdrawal before powerful thrusts of overwhelming new forces within the space of a few days.

Command arrangements in Korea resulted in closely unified sea, air and ground force operations under the direct control of the Commander in Chief, UNC (CINCUNC). Certain inflexible limitations were imposed by terrain, communications and logistical realities. The mountainous spine splitting North Korea from north to south divided the area into two distinct parts for military purposes, dictating a similar division in the command and organizational structure of ground forces during the period -- Eighth Army in the western part and X Corps in the eastern area. (1)

The offensive potential of the North Korean People's Army was strengthened considerably during the first week of November by the physical entry of elements of the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) into the war. CCF units concentrated along the Yalu River were considered by G-2, FEC/UNC as capable of seizing the initiative and

(1) See Chapter II, Operations in Korea.

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launching offensive operations to the south, thereby presenting a definite threat to UN Forces in Korea. The buildup of CCF strength in Manchuria had been closely watched by FEC; strength in Manchuria rose from 116,000 regular troops in July to 450,000 in late September and reached a total of 850,000 in Manchuria and Korea by 16 November. This increase in strength was not considered an immediate indication of warlike intentions or intervention in Korea; it represented a return of forces normally stationed in Manchuria from the south, where they had been transferred for operations against Hainan and Formosa. The possible intentions of Communist China in regard to Korea were given serious consideration when other units not generally within the Manchurian command began to appear in the area in great strength. Deployment of ten CCF corps along the Yalu River increased the potentiality for a large-scale invasion, posing a threat of serious proportions. The unexpected sharp increase of CCF strength in Korea during October was attributed to a combination of circumstances: the receipt of fragmentary and inconclusive information from the first Chinese PW's captured, lack of military knowledge on the part of these PW's, surreptitious crossing of the Yalu River by organized forces at night and the fact that CCF units were committed piecemeal rather than as entire units. Early in November it was evident that the allegedly "token" forces committed to the battle area by Communist China were the possible vanguard of complete divisions and armies to appear within the near future. In addition to the definite large-scale commitment of CCF units from the Third and Fourth Field Armies in China's moves against UN Forces in Korea, the presence of units of the First CCF Field Army on Korea's northeast frontier was considered a further military manpower potential capable of immediate aggression. In mid-November the enemy suddenly ceased his offensive, broke contact with UN Forces and withdrew to positions farther north where the extremely rugged

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terrain lent itself readily to the defense of key features and strong points along major routes of the UN advance. Although the lull in enemy fighting along most of the front and complete loss of contact in some sectors was considered as an indication that the CCF were effecting a withdrawal across the Korean-Manchurian frontier, indications of continuing heavy troop movements into north-east China and Manchuria supported the possibility that Communist China intended to defend the vital reservoirs and power installations along the Yalu River. (2)

The UN general offensive was launched on 24 November to complete the defeat of the North Korean Army, disclose the intentions of the CCF and fulfill the UN mission of securing all of North Korea. CINCUNC's position, as stated to Department of the Army (DA) on 25 November, was that prosecution of the military campaign until the objective of destroying all enemy forces south of Korea's northern boundary was achieved was most important. It was believed that anything less would be regarded by the Korean people as a betrayal of sovereign and territorial integrity; the Chinese and other Asians would regard it as a weakness reflected from appeasement of Communist aggression. Entry of the Chinese Communists into the Korean conflict was a knowingly assumed risk at the time UN Forces were committed initially in June; the hazard would have been greater at the time UN Forces were restricted behind the Pusan Perimeter. CINCUNC believed that prompt implementation of the announced plan to replace American units along the Korean-Manchurian border with Republic of Korea (ROK) Army units, return of US units to Japan, parole of Korean PW's to their homes and unification of all Korea under a single civil government under UN guidance, once the military objective of eliminating the foe from Korean territory was reached, would appeal to the Chinese mind; if not, the situation would not

(2) See Ch III, Intelligence.

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be influenced to any appreciable degree by halting commitments short of promised accomplishment. Accomplishment of the announced military mission was considered as the only hope of checking Soviet and Chinese aggressive designs before the two countries were committed to a course from which, for political reasons, it would be difficult to withdraw. (3)

The Eighth Army offensive progressed rapidly during the first two days, meeting little or no enemy resistance. Heavy CCF counterattacks on 26 November forced withdrawals on the right flank and necessitated commitment of reserves to bolster the sagging lines. The offensive ground to a complete halt on the 27th as the right flank was withdrawn eleven miles to face the axis of the CCF attack. ROK divisions, which had borne the brunt of the attack, were badly disorganized. Complete encirclement of Eighth Army forces was avoided and new defense lines established south of the Chongchon River. Reserves were moved east into the thirty mile gap between Eighth Army and X Corps zones to establish blocking positions and halt the enemy advance. Meanwhile, X Corps units continued advancing along the eastern side of the Korean peninsula and northward toward the Chosin Reservoir. In response to a CINCUNC suggestion for a strong X Corps effort in support of the Eighth Army attack, the Corps Commander responded that it could best assist Eighth Army by continuing its northward advance, destroying Chinese and North Korean Forces in the Chosin Reservoir area and placing X Corps in a position to threaten or cut enemy lines of communication from Manpojin; movement to the west along the only two suitable vehicular roads available would put X Corps troops in the rear of current front lines in Eighth Army sector, making any advance in that direction appear fruitless. X Corps launched the east pincer arm of the UN offensive on 27 November against heavy enemy resistance,

(3) See Ch II, Operations in Korea.

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which cut the main supply routes. On 30 November it was estimated that X Corps was confronted by two CCF Armies in the Chosin Reservoir area and possibly a third on its west flank, forcing a withdrawal of forces to an assembly area in the Hamhung-Hungnam vicinity. UN strength in Korea at the end of November was insufficient to meet the undeclared war launched by the CCF; UN Air Forces could not prevent reinforcements and supplies from crossing the frozen Yalu River. The end of the month found UN Forces completely on the defensive with plans in execution for readjustment of positions and consolidation of forces to face the CCF onslaught. (4)

UN naval and air activities contributed significantly to the success of the November campaign during both advance and withdrawal. Naval units provided fire support for ground forces in addition to carrying out normal patrol, blockade and minesweeping tasks. Aircraft from naval units caused heavy damage to enemy installations and inflicted undetermined enemy casualties. General Far East Air Forces (FEAF) operations instructions established early in November called for complete interdiction of North Korean lines of communication, destruction of supply centers, ground forces and other military targets having an immediate effect on the current situation. Favorable results of FEAF round-the-clock operations were apparent in appraisals of target destruction. Destruction of the Korean end of all international bridges across the Yalu River was accomplished despite the difficulties involved in limiting attacks strictly to the Korean side of the Yalu boundary. Enemy air activities increased, with pilots taking full advantage of their Manchurian sanctuary when engaged by friendly forces. Airlift operations played an increasingly important role in emergency supply of isolated ground units and evacuation of troops, supplies and equipment from untenable forward positions during withdrawal operations toward the end

(4) See Ch II, Operations in Korea.

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of the month. (5)

The shortage of personnel which had plagued FEC even before the beginning of hostilities, continued to harass the command. Many supporting units were shipped to combat areas understrength, thereby reducing unit capabilities considerably. Fewer units at full strength would have provided a limited number of completely effective units as opposed to a larger number of partially effective units. Training programs were instituted to fill acute shortages. A replacement personnel allocation system regulated the flow of replacements to critical spots. (6)

Logistical support became increasingly difficult with the rapid northward advance of UN Forces. The approach of severe winter weather in northern Korea added to the over-all daily supply problems facing the command. (7) Airlift of regular resupply of rations, clothing and motor fuel, in addition to ammunition needs, was necessary early in the month to keep pace with speedy forward movements. (8) Problems connected with critical shortages of arctic clothing as well as normal essential battle items required constant adjustments and solutions. (9)

-
- (5) See Ch II, Operations in Korea.
 - (6) See Ch IV, Personnel.
 - (7) See Ch V, Logistics.
 - (8) See Ch II, Operations in Korea.
 - (9) See Ch V, Logistics.

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Chapter II

OPERATIONS IN KOREA

The end of October brought hopes of an early cessation of hostilities and rapid redeployment of the bulk of US units from Korea, based on probable non-intervention by CCF. The plan called for swift redeployment of Eighth Army to Japan; retention of Japan Logistical Command (JLC); maintenance of ten ROK divisions throughout both North and South Korea; and retention of X Corps in Korea as a major command of UNC. Redeployment of UN Forces from Korea was to be in order of European first and Asiatic last. (1)

Identification of elements of twelve CCF Divisions in forward areas in Korea within the first eleven days of November changed the course of operations from pursuit of a defeated North Korean Army to a new campaign against a fresh enemy force.

1. Ground (2)

On 1 November US elements of the I US Corps were advancing along the coast and beyond Unsan while ROK units regrouped and consolidated positions against elements of the CCF. Overrunning of 1st Cavalry Division positions by enemy forces on the following day halted the I US Corps advance and forced withdrawal of the bulk of its forces south of the Chongchon River. II ROK Corps continued blocking and delaying action against heavy CCF pressure. By 4 November II ROK Corps had regained positions in the Kunu-Won area. At the same time I US Corps reached defensive positions north and northeast of Kunu-ri with IX US Corps occupying positions northeast, east and southeast of the town. I US Corps advanced on 7 November

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- (1) G-3 Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt (TS) Nov 50. (Annex 4)
(2) Information contained in this section was compiled from the UNC G-3 Daily Cops Rpts for the period 31 Oct-30 Nov 50, and G-3 Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Journal Nov 50. (G-3 GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50) (Annex 4)

beyond Sinanju with IX US Corps securing the east flank and II ROK Corps advancing through Tokchon.

On 11 November I US Corps launched an offensive to seize a line of departure for the planned resumption of the UN general offensive scheduled for 15 November. (3) Enemy reaction on 13 November varied from stubborn resistance with strong counterattacks on the right to sporadic resistance on the left and penetration of II ROK Corps positions to a depth of two miles. II ROK Corps regained Tokchon by 15 November, with I US Corps advancing against evidence of enemy withdrawal. The line of departure was reached by all I US Corps units on 17 November with no enemy resistance reported by patrols some 8,000 yards ahead. Meanwhile enemy resistance increased sharply in II ROK Corps area.

The general offensive (4) postponed from 15 November for logistic reasons, jumped off on 24 November as scheduled with I and IX US Corps making gains of from two to eight miles and II ROK Corps advancing from two to three miles without meeting any enemy resist

 (3) In response to a CINCUNC directive forwarded to X US Corps 10 Nov that Corps become familiar with Eighth Army plans in order to be prepared for any possible change in the situation and suggestion that X Corps plans be developed for a strong effort in coordination with resumption of Eighth Army offensive, X Corps Commander responded that it would be inadvisable for X Corps to operate in any strength to the west since the two suitable vehicular routes in that direction in X Corps zone entered Eighth Army zone in the rear of current front lines, making any advance to the west appear a fruitless operation. It was stated that X Corps could best support Eighth Army by continuing its northward advance, destroying Chinese and North Korean forces in the Chosin Reservoir area and placing X Corps in a position to threaten or cut enemy lines of communication from Manpojin. X Corps meanwhile would secure important hydroelectric power installations in its zone and be in a position to complete its ultimate mission. (Ltr (TS), Maj Gen E.M. Almond to Brig Gen E.K. Wright, CH JSPOG & AC of S G-3 GHQ FEC/UNC, 16 Nov 50, no sub. (G-3 Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50, TS J 57) (Annex 4) X Corps was directed on 15 Nov to develop plans for an attack westward upon reaching Changin in order to cut the enemy main supply route Manpojin-Kanggye-Huichon, plan to be executed on orders of CINCUNC. (Rad CX 69009 (TS) Gen Wright to CG X Corps, 15 Nov 50. (G-3 Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50, TS J 50) (Annex 4)
 (4) The general attack was launched by Eighth Army to complete the defeat of the North Korean Army, to disclose the intentions of the CCF and to complete the UN mission of securing all of North Korea. (G-3 Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt (TS) Nov 50) (Annex 4)

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ance. Enemy opposition remained practically non-existent except in the II ROK Corps area on the following day. Trouble developed on 26 November on the IX US Corps right flank and in II ROK Corps zone with 2d US Division under heavy attack and 7th and 8th ROK Divisions forced to withdraw to a defense line south of Tokchon. The II ROK Corps reserve, 6th ROK Division, was committed to bolster 8th ROK Division. The UN offensive ground to a complete halt on 27 November as the right flank of I US Corps was bent backwards to maintain contact with IX US Corps which had withdrawn eleven miles to face the axis of the CCF attack. The 6th ROK Division established blocking positions to contain the enemy; 7th and 8th ROK Divisions were badly disorganized. (5)

Numerous penetrations and infiltrations all along the front developed by 28 November. IX US Corps zone was extended to include that formerly assigned to the battered II ROK Corps. I and IX US Corps began a coordinated retrograde movement to Corps defense lines. IX US Corps reserve, 1st Turkish Armed Forces Command, was committed in the area of the partially surrounded 2d US Division. By 29 November 2d US Division and 1st Turkish Armed Forces Command were able to blunt the main CCF attack aimed at complete encircle-

 (5) On 28 November, four days after Eighth Army resumed the offensive, CINUNC radioed Department of Army (DA) that CCF were committed in North Korea in increasing strength. The aggregate strength was given as 200,000 CCF plus 50,000 North Korean troops. Indications were that CCF units moved northward immediately after the Inchon invasion with heavy concentrations of troops in Manchuria and surreptitious movement by night infiltrations of organized forces into North Korea. The CCF broke contact after checking the UN advance toward the Yalu River late in October to build up in overwhelming strength presumably for a spring offensive, with the ultimate objective aimed at complete destruction of all UN Forces in Korea. Present UN strength was considered insufficient to meet the undeclared war of CCF. It was stated that UN Air Forces could not interdict avenues of reinforcements and supplies crossing the frozen Yalu River. UNC was faced with conditions beyond its control and strength. The strategic plan for the immediate future was indicated as passing from offensive to defensive. (Rad C69953 (TS) CINCFE to DA for JCS, 28 Nov 50; G-3 Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50, TS J 70) (Annex 4)

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ment of UN Forces while I and IX US Corps continued withdrawal to new defense lines. Reserves assigned from all Corps were moving east into the thirty mile gap between Eighth Army and X US Corps to establish blocking positions and halt the enemy advance. (6)

X US Corps advances along the east coast and to the Chosin Reservoir continued during the early days of November against light to moderate enemy resistance. Strong enemy counterattacks met ROK units on the east coast on 13 and 14 November, causing a partial withdrawal. ROK units were able to contain a further strong enemy attack south of the Orang River on 16 November with the assistance of UN air strikes and naval gunfire. Meanwhile US Army and Marine units continued advancing against decreasing enemy resistance east and west of Sang-ni. The ROK Capitol Division seized Yongchon on 19 November, again assisted by UN air strikes and naval gunfire. On 21 November the 17th US Infantry Regiment reached Hyesanjin on the Manchurian border while the ROK Capitol Division captured Chungchonghujang and the 26th ROK Regiment seized Huksu-ri against stiff enemy resistance. By 26 November the 1 ROK Corps had advanced to the outskirts of Chongjin and northeast of Hapsu, US units reaching points southwest of Yudam-ni and northwest of Samsu. Heavy enemy attacks on 28 November against the 1st US Marine Division, one day after launching the east pincer arm of the UN offensive, cut the main supply route. At the same time CCF units penetrated positions of the 7th US Division on the east side of the Chosin Reservoir. Heavy attacks against X US Corps positions in the Chosin Reservoir

(6) Command arrangements in Korea reflected the operational flexibility inherent in the closely unified sea, air and ground forces under CINUNC's direct command as well as the inflexible limitations imposed by terrain, communications and logistical realities. North Korea is split from north to south by a mountainous spine which divides the area, including lines of communication, into two distinct parts for military purposes. This dictated a similar division in the command and organizational structure of the ground forces during the period. (G-3 GHQ FEC, UNC Staff Sec Rpt (TS) Nov 50) (Annex 4)

area continued on the 29th; reserves were attempting to eliminate enemy roadblocks which had cut the main supply route in several places.

On 30 November it was estimated that X US Corps was confronted by two CCF Armies in the Chosin Reservoir area and possibly a third Army on its west flank. Regrouping of forces was progressing as rapidly as possible, with US units scheduled to assemble in the general area around the Hungnam-Hamhung Base. Enemy pressure in the Chosin Reservoir area impeded the desired rapid withdrawal. Two battalions of the 7th US Division were isolated east of the Chosin Reservoir; 400 wounded required helicopter evacuation before the division could launch a drive through enemy roadblocks. The 5th and 7th US Marine Regiments in process of pulling back to Hagaru-ri helped the battalions escape the trap. Withdrawal of Marines from Yudam-ni to the Chosin Reservoir area over a seventeen mile route obstructed by enemy roadblocks was slowed down considerably by the necessity of transporting large numbers of wounded personnel. I ROK Corps advance to the north was discontinued and the Corps directed to regroup. The Wonsan Base was to be closed, with withdrawal of forces to the Hungnam Base. (7)

At the end of November UN Forces were on the defensive with plans in the process of execution for readjustment of Eighth Army positions and consolidation of X Corps units to face the CCF onslaught.

DA indicated concern on 24 November, (8) the day of the Eighth Army jump-off in a general offensive to terminate hostilities in North Korea, over the possibilities of bringing on a general conflict if a major clash developed with the CCF as a result of the UN

(7) Rad X13481 (TS) CG X Corps to CINCFE, 30 Nov 50. (G-3 Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50, TS J 68) (Annex 4)

(8) Rad W 97287 (TS) DEPTAR (CSUSA) to CINCUNC, 24 Nov 50. (G-3 Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50, TS J 81) (Annex 4)

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advance against the entire boundary between Korea and Manchuria-USSR. The radio stated that sentiment existed in the UN for establishment of a demilitarized zone between UN Forces and the frontier in the hope of reducing Chinese Communist fear of UN military action against Manchuria and corresponding sensitivity on the part of the USSR with respect to Vladivostok. A conference with the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to determine military measures UNC might wish to take which would reduce tension with Peiping and Moscow and maintain a solid UN front resulted in the following proposals:

Establishment of a line overlooking the approaches to the Yalu River from the mouth to the position held by the 17th US Regiment and on to Chongjin on the east coast. The frontline forces would be ROK with other UN Forces grouped to insure holding the established line. Chongjin would be the farthest northeast advance point.

UN Forces would make every effort to spare all hydro-electric installations in North Korea.

Orderly elections would be held in North Korea and unification of the country would proceed in the event of no further Chinese Communist attack in force.

Ultimate handling of the sensitive northeast area would await UN procedures.

It was felt that such restrictions would not affect accomplishment of the UNC military mission. At the same time it might provide an out for Communist China to withdraw into Manchuria without loss of face and lessen the concern of Soviet Russia for the security of Vladivostok which was at the root of Russian pressure on Communist China to intervene in Korea.

CINCUNC replied on 25 November (9) that the suggested approach would fail to achieve the desired result and would provoke the very consequences UNC was seeking to prevent. A personal reconnaissance of the Yalu River indicated that it would be impossible to stop on commanding terrain south of the river and hold the lines of approach into North Korea. It was important to prosecute the military cam-

 (9) Rad C69808 (TS) CINCUNC to DEPTAR for JCS, 25 Nov 50. (G-3 Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50, TS J 82) (Annex 4)

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paign until the objective of destroying all enemy forces south of Korea's northern boundary was achieved. The Korean people would regard anything less as a betrayal of sovereign and territorial integrity; the Chinese and the other Asiatics would regard it as a weakness reflected from appeasement of Communist aggression. Political tension between the two countries required that the international boundary be closed to reduce to a minimum lawless border incidents. In view of the fact that hydroelectric facilities at Changjin has been closed down for a full month prior to arrival of UN Forces with no complaint from Soviet or Chinese sources, FEC did not consider dependence upon hydroelectric facilities in North Korea a major factor in the basic causes giving rise to Chinese aggressive moves in North Korea. Entry of the Chinese Communists into the Korean conflict was a knowingly assumed risk at the time UN Forces were committed initially in June; the hazard would have been greater at the time UN Forces were restricted behind the Pusan Perimeter. It was made publicly and repeatedly clear that no aggressive designs were entertained against any part of Chinese or Soviet territory. Once positions were consolidated along the Yalu River ROK Forces would replace American units, the return of US Forces to Japan would be announced publicly and all Korean PW's would be paroled to their homes, leaving the unification of Korea and restoration of civil government to Koreans with the advice and assistance of the UN. It was believed that prompt implementation of the plan once military objectives were reached would appeal to the Chinese mind; if not, "the resulting situation is not one which might be influenced by bringing to halt our military measures short of present commitments." It was stated that accomplishment of the announced military mission was the only hope of checking Soviet and Chinese aggressive designs before the two countries were committed to a course "from which for political reasons they cannot withdraw."

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2. Navy (10)

UN naval units participating in Korean operations during November comprised TG 70.1, TF 77, TF 90, TG 96.0 and TF 95, the latter including TG 95.1 (Korean Blockade Unit No. 1), TG 95-2 (Korean Blockade Unit No. 2), TG 95.6 and TG 95.7 (ROK Navy). Ships composing these units were drawn from the United States, Great Britain, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and France. The French sloop, FS La Grandiere, was relieved from Korean duties during the latter part of November and returned to France for support of operations against Communist Viet-Minh forces in French Indo-China.

Those units engaging primarily in patrol, blockade and mine-sweeping operations were also called upon to provide fire support for ground forces as required. TG 95.2 fired several missions in support of the ROK Capitol Division's drive up the east coast to Chongjin; on the 14th the unit neutralized enemy troops and succeeded in halting an attack on Capitol Division positions. Tasks in support of ground forces included combat air patrol, illuminating and harassing missions as well as specific target assignments. Aircraft from naval units strafed, bombed, rocketed and napalmed enemy troop concentrations, bivouac areas and troop columns, inflicting undetermined casualties. Aircraft missions were hampered or aborted on several occasions by such weather conditions as snow, ice, high winds and zero visibility.

The following enemy installations and equipment were reported as damaged or destroyed in over 3,000 sorties by naval aircraft on reconnaissance, minespotting, air patrol and close support missions during November:

(10) Information in this section was compiled from the UNC G-3 Daily Opns Rpts for the period 31 Oct-30 Nov covering naval operations for the period 30 Oct-28 Nov. (G-3 Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50) (Annex 4)

	<u>Destroyed</u>	<u>Damaged</u>
Aircraft	33	33
Trucks	63	33
Carts	1	8
Tanks	7	7
Miscellaneous Vehicles	48	48
Jeeps	2	1
Locomotives		7
Switch Engines	1	1
Railroad Cars	4	27
Small Boats	2	
Enemy Occupied Bldgs	108	68
Enemy Supply/Personnel Bldgs	9	2
Military Bldgs	77	32
Military Barracks	1	4
Warehouses	54	64
Factories		2
Roundhouses		1
Railroad shops		4
Bldgs Containing Ammunition	3	
Ammunition Dumps	6	
Supply Dumps	3	7
POI Dumps		4
Oil Storage Tanks	4	1
Gun Emplacements	1	1
Artillery Pieces		1
Anti-aircraft Positions	2	1
Field Pieces	2	1
Self-Propelled Guns	2	
Bridges	8	25

TG 90, in addition to firing ground support missions, was engaged in offloading the 1st US Marine Division and 3rd US Infantry Divisions at Wonsan and 7th US Infantry Division at Iwon during the month. TG 95.7, composed of ROK naval units, was utilized for close inshore patrol of Korean waters and transporting ROK Marines.

Minesweeping operations continued throughout the month on both the east and west coasts of Korea. Chinnampo channel was cleared by 10 November for LST's and at high tide for ships with a draft up to twenty-one feet. Minesweeping at Hungnam was completed by 14 November and at Songjin by 20 November.

Aircraft from TF 77 attacked bridges at Chongsongjin, Manpojin, Samsu and Sinuiju on 9 and 10 November. The Sinuiju bridges were heavily damaged in these raids and a later one on 15 November; two direct hits were scored on the railroad bridge at Sinuiju on 18 November. Other attacks on bridges during the month indicated those in the Chongjin, Naman and Hyesanjin areas. Direct hits with

1,000 pound bombs were scored on hangars and buildings at the Chongjin airfield in a bombing and strafing mission on 10 November.

Planes from the USS Philippine Sea (TF 77) were attacked by four MIG-15 jet aircraft in the Sinuiju area on 9 November; one MIG was shot down. On the following day another MIG was destroyed. In an engagement with twelve MIG-15's on 18 November, aircraft from TF 77 destroyed one and damaged three before the aircraft were able to escape to their inviolable Manchurian sanctuary.

3. Air (11)

General Far East Air Forces (FEAF) operations instructions established early in November required complete interdiction of North Korean lines of communication, destruction of supply centers, ground forces and other military targets having an immediate effect on the current situation. Fifth Air Force was called upon to conduct aggressive armed reconnaissance of enemy lines of communication leading from the battle area on a round-the-clock basis. Further tasks included day and night visual reconnaissance with photographic verification to determine enemy strength, composition and direction of movement. Day coverage of North Korean airfields was an additional routine mission. Land based US Marine Corps Air Force, Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF), South African Air Force and ROK Air Force contingents supplemented USAF units operating under Fifth Air Force control in the Korean conflict. FEAF Bomber Command (BOLCOM) attempted to stem enemy advances by incessant attacks on marshalling yards, military storage areas, communications and supply centers, highway and railroad bridges and numerous additional targets specified for destruction in support of ground forces activities, as

(11) Information in this section was compiled from the UNC G-3 Daily Opns Rpts for the period 31 Oct-30 Nov and cover air operations for the period 30 Oct-28 Nov. (G-3 Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50) (Annex 4)

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well as conducting psychological warfare leaflet drops over enemy troops and specific locales in North Korea.

During the two week period beginning around 5 November, a systematic campaign was initiated to destroy the Korean end of all international rail and highway bridges on the Korean-Manchurian border plus every means of communication, supply center, high command post, troop area, installation, factory, city and village in North Korea south of the border, with the exception of the Hashin and Suiho Dams and other electric power plants. Special bombing procedures and revised bombing techniques were adopted in Yalu River bridge attacks to preclude the possibility of bombs falling on the Manchurian side. Missions were flown so close to the border that escorting fighters could protect only one side of the B-29's. Air crews were forbidden to bomb near-border targets unless visual bomb sightings were possible. In order to minimize enemy counter air operations Fifth Air Force conducted pre-attack strafing of AA positions in the Sinuiju area prior to BOMCOM's 8 November maximum effort and provided fighter cover during the strike. In the 8 November raid the east approaches to the Yalu River bridges were bombed with "poor to excellent" results; key communications and supply centers at Sinuiju were bombed with "excellent" results. "Excellent" results likewise were reported in a 12 November raid on Manpojin with incendiary clusters. Sinuiju, Manpojin and other Yalu River crossing points, together with railroad and highway approaches into Korea from these points, were attacked consistently during the remainder of the month in efforts to halt the influx of troop reinforcements and supplies from Manchuria to support enemy forces in North Korea.

In conjunction with the Eighth Army resumption of the general offensive on 24 November, Fifth Air Force and FEAF Bomber Command were directed to provide maximum available air support, considering

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minimum and emergency requirements for X Corps, for a period of six days beginning one day prior to the offensive. (12) Stepped-up attacks were concentrated on important and critical bridges in the Eighth Army zone south of the Yalu River and within fifteen miles of the Korean-Manchurian border. Close support missions were intensified greatly following the situation reversal on the ground after 26 November. Heavily armed fighters and light bombers were constantly bombing, strafing, rocketing and napalming enemy troops, tanks and equipment immediately ahead of UN Forces.

In its conduct of cargo, troop transport and air evacuation operations into and out of Korea, Combat Cargo Command (COMCARCOM) flew over 6,000 sorties handling more than 20,000 airlift passengers, nearly 9,500 evacuees and some 59,500,000 pounds of freight during the period 30 October through 28 November. Peak evacuee load was reached on 28 November with the airlift of 962 persons. During the early part of the month, due to rapid advances of ground troops, airlift to the battle front of regular day-to-day resupply of rations, clothing and motor fuel became necessary, in addition to normal demand for critically short supply items, such as ammunition. Toward the end of the month airlift began to play an increasingly important role in the evacuation of troops, supplies and equipment from untenable forward positions. COMCARCOM frequently was called upon to airlift emergency supplies to isolated ground units and undertake propaganda leaflet drops over designated areas.

Enemy air activities increased, with pilots becoming bolder and more aggressive yet taking full advantage of the sanctuary across the Yalu River when engaged by friendly forces. MIG-15 jet aircraft were first sent into combat by the enemy in the Sinuiju

(12) 8th A requested this support on 20 Nov. (Rad GX 20010 KAR
(S) CG 8th A to CG 5th AF & COMNAFEL, 20 Nov 50; G-3 Sec GHO FEC/
UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50, J 68 20 Nov) (Annex 4)

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sector. Total enemy aircraft destroyed or damaged by FEAF in the air and on the ground during the period included fifteen jet and twenty-three YAK type planes.

Weather became an increasingly limiting factor during the month. Fog was prevalent in the mornings in the north central and west sectors during the first period, with low cloudiness and snow toward the end of the month. Smoke remained the chief contributing factor in restricting visibility in the battle area.

Total sorties flown by FEAF units during November reached 18,445 including 3,862 close support, 5,284 interdiction, 6,544 cargo and 2,755 miscellaneous. (13) Known enemy casualties inflicted by air strikes were recorded as 10,594. Reported results of sorties, exclusive of those flown by Bomber Command, were as follows: (14)

	<u>Destroyed</u>	<u>Damaged</u>
Miscellaneous Vehicles	1775	109
Supply Carts	12	
Military Supply Bldgs	164	322
Military Supply Bldgs/Dumps	253	373
Bldgs, Troop/Supplies	1263	817
Supply Bldgs/Dumps/Warehouses	186	81
Enemy Occupied Bldgs/Factories	64	137
Enemy Occupied Villages	5	4
Pack Animals	78	
Drums, Oil	20	
Drums, Fuel	30	
Drums, POL	23	5
Dumps, Ammo	22	
Dumps, Ammo and POL	7	
Dumps, Supply	124	190
Dumps, Fuel	15	1
Field Pieces	34	5
Gun Emplacements	163	72
Gun Positions	6	1
Anti-aircraft Positions	13	3
Tanks	103	109
Road Blocks	1	
Camouflaged Objects	17	1

(13) Information obtained from FEAF Director of Statistical Services in Tokyo as contained in FEAF Command Reference Book (S), 1 Dec 50.

(14) Information compiled from UNC G-3 Opns Rpts for the period 31 Oct-30 Nov covering the period 30 Oct-28 Nov. (G-3 Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50) (Annex 4)

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	<u>Destroyed</u>	<u>Damaged</u>
Locomotives	14	22
Railroad Cars	112	222
Railroad Stations	2	1
Marshalling Yards		14
Railroad Tunnels		13
Railroad Trestles		1
Aircraft, u/k		1
Aircraft, YAK Type	9	8
Aircraft, Jet Type		2
Aircraft, L-5	3	2
Aircraft, YAK-9	6	
Aircraft, MIG-15	3	10
Lumber Yard/Plant	2	
Boats	19	6
Barges	20	
Command Posts	2	
Radio Stations		1
Bridges	11	12
Tunnels	1	18

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Chapter III
INTELLIGENCE

Early in October, prior to the UN crossing of the 38th Parallel, Communist China had promised to support North Korean efforts to "liberate" Korea. This was accompanied by an intensive propaganda campaign against the US. (1) The US was accused of following in the footsteps of Japan by annexing Korea, invading Manchuria, conquering China and ultimately dominating all of Asia; the Chinese were urged to unify and fight this "aggression" against Korea, their neighbor. The similarity of this program with North Korean propaganda prior to 25 June supported the assumption that Chinese Communist leaders were preparing their people psychologically for war. (2)

1. Ground

CCF strength in Manchuria had steadily increased from 116,000 regular troops on 8 July to 45,000 by 21 September and 850,000 by 16 November. This growth of strength was not considered an immediate indication of warlike intentions or intervention by the Chinese Communists in Korea; it represented the return of forces of the Fourth Chinese Army group from the south, where they had been transferred to participate in operations against Hainan and Formosa, to duty stations in Manchuria. When other units not normally within the Fourth Army Group began to appear in great strength, serious consideration was given to the possible intentions of the Chinese Communists. The deployment of CCF troops along the Yalu River became significant; the buildup reached a total of ten corps each with three divisions; additional troops were deployed in the Tumen area

(1) G-2 Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt (S) Nov 50, Ch V, Summary of Enemy Intelligence, Sec 2, Changes in Enemy Situation During November. (Annex 3)

(2) Ibid, Sec 3 f, Psychological Preparation of the Chinese for War.

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farther to the north. The potential threat of a large-scale invasion became increasingly evident. The liquidation of the North Korean Communists was in process of accomplishment; probable intervention by Communist China posed a threat of serious proportions. (3)

Physical entry of sizeable CCF units into the Korean conflict started in mid-October and progressed steadily. Total strength of CCF units identified as having crossed the Yalu River during October was estimated at 200,000 with an obvious potential of further reinforcement. The sharp increase in known CCF strength in Korea was attributed chiefly to the receipt of fragmentary and inconclusive information from the first CCF PW's captured, lack of knowledge on the part of these PW's and the fact that CCF units undoubtedly were committed piecemeal rather than as entire units. Although initial Chinese Communist radio broadcasts professed that only a token force from each of three divisions had entered the battle, receipt of additional information necessitated an almost constant adjustment of strength upward. As early as 3 November it was estimated that these token forces were a possible vanguard of complete divisions and armies to appear within the near future. This early appraisal was borne out by subsequent information. (4)

Vehicular and rail sightings during the month pointed out the pattern of troop movement and concentration. As UN Forces advanced northward the quantity of enemy railroad rolling stock sighted steadily decreased until it became almost negligible during the first two weeks of November. Beginning about the middle of the month rolling stock reappeared in some quantity and increased during the last two weeks of the month, reaching a peak on 28 November. Rail traffic was concentrated in the north central and northwestern

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- (3) Ibid, Sec 2, Changes in Enemy Situation During November.
(4) Ibid, Sec 2, Changes in Enemy Situation During November.

parts of Korea for the period 14 to 30 November with the heaviest sightings on the Manpojin-Kanggye-Huichon line. During the month enemy vehicular traffic was concentrated in the central and western sectors of North Korea, with the greatest volume in the central part. The volume was heaviest during the first two weeks of November, followed by a steady decrease during mid-November and an increase during the last week of the month. The mid-November decrease was not attributed to the weather, since conditions for observation were more favorable during this period than during the preceding period; it ran concurrently with the lull in enemy ground activity during the period. The increase in vehicles sighted between 21 and 28 November indicated a buildup of enemy forces in the Huichon-Onjong-Yongbyong area. The concurrent acceleration in the volume of rail and motor traffic indicated that during the latter part of November the enemy used both railroads and motor vehicles to build up forces for his counteroffensive. (5)

In initial aggressive action against UN Forces in Korea only units of the Fourth CCF Field Army appeared to be involved. Further commitment of CCF troops indicated the probability that the Fourth CCF Field Army was operating solely in Eighth Army zone while the Third Field Army operated in X Corps area. In addition to the large-scale commitment of CCF from the Third and Fourth Field Armies in China's aggressive moves against UN Forces in Korea the definite presence of units of the First CCF Field Army on Korea's northeast frontier was considered an additional military manpower potential capable of immediate aggression. (6)

Physical entry of elements of CCF units into the war during the first week of November materially strengthened the North Korean People's Army. During the middle of the month the enemy evolved a

(5) Ibid, Sec 1, c, 4), Lines of Communication.

(6) Ibid, Sec 2, Changes in Enemy Situation During November

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definite withdrawal-definite trend. In contrast to earlier offensive efforts, enemy forces suddenly reversed, broke contact and withdrew to positions farther north where the extremely rugged terrain lent itself readily to the defense of key features and strong points along the major routes of UN advance. Although the lull in fighting along most of the front and complete loss of contact in some sectors indicated the possibility that the CCF were effecting a withdrawal across the Korean-Manchurian border, there were strong indications that the enemy was continuing a heavy troop buildup in Northeast China and Manchuria. It was considered probable that the CCF had not withdrawn entirely and had every intention of defending stubbornly the vital reservoirs and power installations along the Yalu River. (7)

Light, sporadic enemy resistance met drives by UN Forces on the first day of their general offensive, 24 November. Resistance stiffened on the 25th with several enemy counterattacks launched in an effort to slow the UN advance; these did not materially affect the UN drive at the time. Beginning on 26 November enemy resistance changed sharply to an aggressive counteroffensive, with particularly strong attacks initiated against UN Forces in the western sector of the front. Intensified enemy pressure along most of the western sector of North Korea halted the UN advance on the 27th, forcing UN Forces to withdraw to new positions. By the end of the month enemy pressure had diminished perceptibly almost as suddenly as it had begun. (8)

2. Guerrilla Activities (9)

Guerrilla strength during November was estimated between 32,000 and 35,000. While many were unarmed, the bands usually were

(7) Ibid, Sec 1, a, Summary, Enemy Operations During November.

(8) Ibid, Sec 1, a, Summary, Enemy Operations During November.

(9) Ibid, Sec 3, d, Guerrilla Activity During November.

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equipped with hand grenades, small arms of varying descriptions, mortars and explosives for demolition purposes. Of more importance than their original source of ordnance supply was the guerrillas' capacity to replenish their stocks through raids on UN installations or from fixed caches and by-passed North Korean Army supply points. The continued discovery and destruction of these potential arsenals by UN Forces was expected to lessen the scale of guerrilla activities to a large extent.

The general pattern of guerrilla activities during November could be deduced from confirmed guerrilla group sightings for the period. For the first week, sightings were numerous south of the 38th Parallel with emphasis on the southeast sector of the Nonsong-Pyongtaek-Kumchon area. In North Korea the pattern followed generally in the path of the latest advance of the 3d ROK Division along the east coast. During the second week of the month a shift of activity from south to north was observed, with relatively few affected areas south of Seoul reported as compared with the area north of the 38th Parallel. Affected areas were the Eighth Army and X Corps front lines and paths of the rapid UN advance. During the remainder of the month areas of activity were generally the same, with a definite increase in frequency of guerrilla operations.

The situation with respect to guerrilla bands was extremely serious by the end of November. The scope and effectiveness of guerrilla activities kept approximately 30 percent of the total UN troop strength in Korea engaged in anti-guerrilla operations, diverting combat units from front line duty and precluding formation of an adequate reserve. Wherever these guerrilla forces were permitted to operate unhindered they could expand, extend their control over wider areas and effectively undermine public morale. Most of their successes against UN supply lines during November were limited to attacks on small supply convoys.

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Control and communications for guerrilla forces apparently were not carried out according to any large-scale plan during the early part of the month. Later indications revealed that such action had been undertaken. Radio broadcasts from Peiping and Moscow had taken considerable care to report "activities of guerrillas in UN rear areas" which, while ostensibly for news value, were so phrased that they could have been utilized as an operational pattern and control for these predatory bands.

3. Air (10)

Beginning 1 November enemy air activity showed a marked increase over that previously encountered in the Korean conflict. In view of the appearance of enemy aircraft in numbers greater than the estimated strength of the North Korean Air Force it was estimated that units of the Chinese Communist Air Force had entered the war, possibly in the guise of "volunteers." The UN advance into North Korea made the enemy hit-and-run type of attack from Manchurian bases a serious problem. Air facilities north of the Yalu River gave the enemy sufficient bases to support increased air operations; from this sanctuary North Korean or CCF planes were capable of making fast trips to target areas and returning with good chances of slipping through UN fighter forces. Enemy air action indicated that enemy pilots were reluctant to press attacks against friendly aircraft particularly when opposed by equal or large numbers of aircraft. Attacks were usually made individually rather than in formation with resultant uncoordinated passes and lack of concentration of fire power. The enemy's combat forces by jet type aircraft were confined mainly to areas close to the Korean-Manchurian border; proximity of Manchuria lessened the possibility of damaged aircraft falling into UN hands and allowed enemy pilots the decided advantage of a safe haven. The second week of November saw the greatest amount

(19) Ibid, Sec 1, c, 1), Enemy Air Forces.

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of enemy air action for the month; for the first time during the war air action was encountered for seven consecutive days. On five occasions jet aircraft met jet aircraft in what were believed to be the first instances of armed aerial combat between jets. Enemy pilots became increasingly bolder and more aggressive as the week passed, although they continued to remain in the vicinity of their Manchurian sanctuary.

The plan of attack for MIG-15 jets seemed to follow a standard pattern. They would fly on the Manchurian side of the Yalu River until they sighted a UN aircraft. Then they immediately headed north until they were out of sight, gaining altitude on the way. When they had altitude advantage, they would return to the attack and sweep back into Manchuria, where the whole process would be repeated. The enemy refused to be enticed away from the border by UN aircraft.

Although it was not possible to identify positively the nationality of the enemy planes and pilots operating in Korea, the aircraft were definitely known to be of Soviet design. During the first part of November the enemy began employing MIG-15, a new elliptical wing jet aircraft and a B-29 type bomber. The short, hit-and-run variety of his bombing and strafing attacks indicated that he was probably testing these newer types for battle performance. In view of the efficient deployment of UN Air Forces in Korea the sudden appearance of the Soviet type jets was not considered a serious threat. They were not believed capable of seriously interfering with the UN offensive without substantial Soviet reinforcements, which were not considered likely.

4. Casualties (11)

The total of 31,473 casualties estimated to have been inflicted

(11) Ibid, Sec 3, a, Estimated Enemy Losses.

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on enemy forces during November (exclusive of UN Navy-inflicted losses), comprising battle casualties, PW's and non-battle casualties, was considered to be a minimum estimate of losses suffered by the enemy during the period. The retrograde movement executed by UN Forces during the latter part of the month precluded an accurate assessment of enemy casualties. Indications were that the greater percentage of those enemy personnel suffering wounds serious enough to render the individual completely incapacitated would eventually perish instead of returning to duty, as is normal in most modern armies. This was due to the reported lack of or inadequate provision for medical treatment, supplies and evacuation within the CCF.

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Chapter IV

PERSONNEL

The never-ending struggle to secure sufficient capable, well-trained personnel continued to harass the command in practically all echelons. Actual 30 November US command strength of 220,718 was nearly 80,000 under the authorized level of 300,000; efforts were being made to reduce this understrength which was chiefly in the enlisted grades. (1) Replacements scheduled for shipment during December were less than half the 74,000 required. (2) The critical personnel situation in FEC influenced the DA to grant authority for assignment of personnel to second consecutive tours of foreign service in areas having normal tours of less than thirty months and to broaden the authority of CINCPAC to make appointments in the Officers Reserve Corps. (3) Signal Section's efforts to have the troop ceiling raised to increase the number of Signal Corps personnel allotted to FEC were unsuccessful. (4)

Highest UN ground and air forces assigned strength in Korea for the period 30 October through 28 November was 357,426, reached on 27 November. Ground force totals were as follows: 177,979 US; 145,691 ROK; 12,118 UK; 1,349 Filipino; 5,051 Turkish; 1,181 Thai; and 636 Netherlands. Air Forces personnel in Korea totalled 13,416 for the same day. During the month the 29th Infantry Brigade Group, UK, the 21st Thailand Regiment and the Netherlands Battalion were assigned to forces in Korea. (5) Average assigned strength of UN

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- (1) G-1 Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50. (Annex 2)
 - (2) AG Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50. (Annex 6)
 - (3) AG Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50. (Annex 6)
 - (4) Sig Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50. (Annex 23)
 - (5) Forces of the following fifteen member nations, UNC, were participating in or supporting military operations in Korea as of 26 November: Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, India, Korea, Netherlands, New Zealand, The Philippines, South Africa, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States.

Forces in Korea, exclusive of Navy, for the period 30 October through 28 November was as follows: 326,102 over-all; 171,517 US; 121,971 ROK; 6,210 UK; 7,263 other; (6) and 13,335 air. (7)

Reported casualties for the period 30 October through 28 November were as follows: (8)

	KIA (9)	WIA	MIA	TOTAL	NB	TOTAL
US						
Army	358	2,143	1,819	4,320	5,049	9,369
Marine	135	515	4	654	1,786	2,440
Navy	3	20	14	37		37
Air Force	33	44	45	122	9	131
Total	529	2,722	1,882	5,133	6,844	11,977
ROK	971	5,296	12,674	18,941	2,245	21,186
UK	25	162	2	189	102	291
PEFTCK (10)					38	38
Total	996	5,458	12,676	19,130	2,385	21,515
Total	1,525	8,120	14,558	24,263	9,229	33,492

Units which ordinarily would have been shipped directly to combat areas had to be retained in Japan for correction of deficiencies. Chemical Corps units reaching the theater usually were not fully manned, trained or equipped. (11) Supporting units in most instances were understrength continuously and insufficient in number to support operations in Korea properly. The quantity of Provost Marshal (PM) replacements from the zone of interior (ZI) was not adequate to fill requisitions from Korea. (12) Engineering units had approximately 75% of authorized personnel assigned. (13) There was an extreme shortage of Quartermaster Corps (QM) units in Korea; units shipped to FEC from ZI generally were understrength, thereby reducing unit capabilities considerably. (14) The lack of

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- (6) Includes Thai, Netherlands, Turkish and Filipino.
- (7) Information compiled from UNC G-3 Opns Rpts for the period 31 Oct-30 Nov 50. (G-3 Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50) (Annex 4)
- (8) Information compiled from UNC C-3 Opns Rpts for the period 31 Oct-30 Nov 50. (G-3 Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50) (Annex 4)
- (9) Explanation of abbreviations: KIA, Killed in Action; WIA Wounded in Action; MIA, Missing in Action, NB, Non-Battle.
- (10) Philippines Expeditionary Force to Korea.
- (11) Chem Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50. (Annex 10)
- (12) PM Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50. (Annex 19)
- (13) Eng Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50. (Annex 13)
- (14) QM Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50. (Annex 21)

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sufficient trained personnel to care for the large number of neuro-surgical casualties occurring in forward areas in Korea continued to be a serious problem. (15) The constant shortage of linguists in the theater created difficulties both at headquarters and in the field. Requisitions for Chinese linguists to cover interrogation of captured Chinese Communist troops were only partially satisfied by the DA. (16) The need for additional Graves Registration units in Korea was borne out by an inspection by TIG, DA and IG, FEC. (17) Personnel in Graves Registration Teams were too few in number to fingerprint all battle dead, resulting in the fingerprinting of only those whose identity was not established completely. (18)

Training of replacements was initiated in an effort to meet specialized manpower requirements. Increase in postal operations necessitated requisitioning a group of enlisted men from the replacement pipeline for training in post office procedures. (19) Signal Section requisitioned 100 non-Signal Corps replacements for training in Signal communications center procedures and cryptography. It was believed that when the sixty day intensive training period was completed a large portion of Signal Section personnel problems would be cleared up. The Signal Corps personnel situation was somewhat eased by the flow of Enlisted Reserve replacements from the ZI. Although these replacements were not fully trained the need was so critical that they were sent directly to units in the field without refresher training in Japan. (20)

The lack of military personnel and skilled Koreans capable of

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- (15) Eng Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50. (Annex 13)
 - (16) G-2 Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50. (Annex 3) Discussion of methods utilized in overcoming this shortage is contained in Ch VII.
 - (17) IG Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50. (Annex 15)
 - (18) QM Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50. (Annex 21)
 - (19) AG Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50. (Annex 6)
 - (20) Sig Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50. (Annex 23)

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handling repair and maintenance of floating cranes and light salvage work necessitated letting a contract for such work at ports in Korea to a Japanese salvage company for the period 13 November 1950 to 12 May 1951. (21)

Manpower shortage was not confined to military alone. Recruitment of sufficient civilian personnel to provide an adequate working force for GHQ continued to be a serious problem. Personnel requisitions for recruitment in the US were not filled as rapidly as desired due to increased employment opportunities in the US, lack of monetary incentive to induce employment in Japan and reluctance on the part of US residents to come to Japan during the period of unsettled world affairs. (22)

In some GHQ sections the loss of military personnel was compensated for partially by increased utilization of civilians and Japanese. The use of Japanese was expected to be affected considerably by reductions in the authorized manning level and yen budget for the fiscal year 1951. (23) WAC personnel arriving in the theater were used generally to replace male personnel released for combat. (24)

In order to establish a replacement personnel allocation control system a procedure was established whereby JLC furnished daily reports of shipment by air and surface transportation of replacements to Eighth Army and X Corps in Korea to AG, GHQ. JLC Replacement Training Center furnished daily reports to AG of disposition of general service and limited service personnel. The daily reports were used to control the flow of replacements.

A total of 14,687 enemy prisoners of war (PW) were reported

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- (21) Trans Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50. (Annex 25)
 - (22) Civ Pers Sec GHQ FLC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50. (Annex 11)
 - (23) Headquarters & Serv Cmd GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50. (Annex 14)
 - (24) G-1 Sec GHQ FLC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50. (Annex 2)
 - (25) AG Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50. (Annex 6)

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for the period 30 October through 28 November. (26) Handling of PW's conformed to the provisions of the Geneva Convention of 1949. Enemy PW's were processed, screened by ROK teams to effect release of South Koreans impressed into service by North Korea, given suitable clothing, shelter, adequate nourishing food and medical care. It was yet too early to assess the real value of this humanitarian treatment of North Korean PW's on a people long under oppressive Japanese and later Communist rule. It was not expected that International Red Cross representatives would be given an opportunity to visit the camps in Manchuria where US PW's reportedly were taken or that other humanitarian practices expressed at the Geneva Convention would be experienced by UN personnel in enemy hands. (27)

UN dead were interred in temporary UN cemeteries in Korea with separate areas for the dead of different nations marked by the flag of the nation and the UN flag. (28)

Troop morale, always important to the Army high command, becomes increasingly significant in periods of hostilities. FEC/UNC continued its strenuous efforts to improve the situation of the individual soldier in the field and to provide as much in the way of relaxation and entertainment as was possible under battle conditions. One of the largest single projects attempted was "Operation Santa Claus," whereby military personnel in Korea could send mail orders to the Army Central Exchange in Japan for purchase of Christmas gifts by volunteer workers. These gifts were shipped to designated recipients. A total of over 4,000 orders amounting to more than \$95,000 were processed by the end of November. (29)

A revaluation based on conditions arising out of the Korean

(26) Information compiled from UNC G-3 Opns Rpts for the period 31 Oct-30 Nov 50. (G-3 Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50) (Annex 4)

(27) G-1 Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50. (Annex 2)

(28) G-1 Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50. (Annex 2)

(29) Sp Serv Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50. (Annex 24)

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crisis and the changing informational and educational needs of the armed forces in Korea was initiated. A seventy-two page booklet, "Fight for America," outlining the events leading up to the war, the US position in the struggle for world peace, activities of the UN for peace and the nature of the enemy was published and distributed, chiefly in Korea. Every effort was made to get currently significant news and information to the troops by every available means. Work was started on a weekly news poster consisting of a world map numbered to indicate eight to ten important news events and surrounded with brief resumes of the numbered events appropriately illustrated. Locations were selected for AFRS (30) stations at Pyongyang and Hamhung in Korea. Personnel and equipment for the Pyongyang station was ready and waiting for clarification of the tactical situation at the end of November. Japan AFRS was authorized the use of Japanese shortwave facilities for broadcasts to Korea. On 29 November a shortwave broadcast of Australian news for Australian troops was started; plans were underway for additional newscasts for other UN troops in Korea. (31)

The first mobile USAFI unit sent to Korea on 2 November visited installations of the 2d Logistical Command. Orders were requested for the movement of two mobile units to Korea early in December. Extension from six to nine months was requested on enrollment of USAFI students in combat who had been consistently active before the Korean war. (32)

Joe DiMaggio and Lefty O'Doul toured the hospitals of Japan and Korea for three weeks during November contributing to the morale of sick and wounded soldiers. (33)

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- (30) Armed Forces Radio Service.
 - (31) Troop Inf & Ed Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50. (Annex 26)
 - (32) Troop Inf & Ed Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50. (Annex 26)
 - (33) Sp Serv Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50. (Annex 24)

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Chapter V

LOGISTICS

The rapid northward progress of UN Forces following the breakthrough from the Fusan Perimeter lengthened supply lines and made logistical support increasingly difficult particularly in the face of expected severe winter weather in North Korea. This delayed distribution of arctic clothing to all troops as early as was desired and further made it almost impossible to get winter clothing on hand in Japan to the ROK Army during November. (1) Shortage of arctic clothing and equipment necessitated centralized control whereby all stocks were frozen in or routed through Japan. (2) Clothing from stocks in Japan and salvage clothing in Korea was utilized to relieve the terrific strain on limited available stocks induced by capture of large numbers of PW's. Plans were made for maximum utilization of the large Japanese productive capacity to provide as many supplies as possible locally. (3)

With the approach of winter it became essential that documents dealing with cold weather operations of Ordnance equipment be forwarded to Eighth Army and X Corps immediately. (4) Preparations were under way for manufacture of cold weather type dry batteries. (5)

Entry of CCF into the Korean war necessitated a review of Ordnance requirements for FEC. Requisitions for large amounts of ammunition due for shipment from ZI had been cancelled following the collapse of the North Korean Army. This cancellation was withdrawn and arrangements made for offloading in X Corps and Eighth

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- (1) QM Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50. (Annex 21)
 - (2) G-4 Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50. (Annex 5)
 - (3) QM Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50. (Annex 21)
 - (4) Ord Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50. (Annex 18)
 - (5) Sig Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50. (Annex 23)

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Army areas in Korea to speed up supply. (6) FEC authorized ammunition levels were reached during November with the exception of 4.2 inch mortar and 3.5 inch rocket ammunition still in limited ZI production. During tactical reverses in Korea in the latter part of November there were small losses in Eighth Army ammunition stocks in forward areas; these were minor in comparison to the over-all ammunition situation. (7)

Shortage of Signal Corps field wire was serious. Consumption of field wire in Korea averaged from forty to fifty thousand miles per month due to the rugged terrain, widespread battle fronts and changing tactical situation. Shipment documents from the US indicated substitution of a different type wire from that requested. Although the substituted wire would not last long under combat conditions it had to be accepted since the supply of regular field wire was insufficient. (8)

Standardization of equipment to eliminate supply difficulties was sought constantly. Although both JP-1 and JP-3 fuel for jet aircraft was scheduled to be available during the last half of 1951, plans were under way to modify all jet aircraft in FEC to operate on JP-3 fuels. (9) Two types of radio-controlled planes were on hand in FEC, each requiring different accessories and distinctive types of launchers. Standardization of radio-controlled targets to simplify supply procedures was greatly desired. (10)

A critical tanker shortage due to support of the Korean conflict did not permit sufficient time to clean the tankers properly, causing contamination in some instances. Measures were being taken to remedy the situation. (11)

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- (6) Ord Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50. (Annex 18)
 - (7) G-4 Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50. (Annex 5)
 - (8) Sig Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50. (Annex 23)
 - (9) G-4 Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50. (Annex 5)
 - (10) Anti-Aircraft Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50. (Annex 7)
 - (11) G-4 Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50. (Annex 11)

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Locomotives and other rolling stock in Korea destroyed during the course of the war had to be replaced by purchase from Japanese manufactures. Japanese standards were used for specifications since manufacture of the equipment in Japan according to US standards in any reasonable length of time would have been impossible. (12)

Previous information indicated that equipment for five ROK divisions, with certain exceptions, could be supplied from the US at the rate of one division per month, starting in September. Activation of ROK divisions was continued on that basis. A later DA request that minimum equipage be provided, with captured enemy equipment and local procurement utilized where possible, was not considered advisable by FEC in view of the existing tactical situation. (13)

Captured enemy equipment was let out on a local basis subject to ultimate determination of title. Such equipment could be issued by field commanders to forces under their control when required for combat purposes. (14)

Requirements for combat rations were revised to meet the increased strength of UN Forces. Special rations, locally procured and packed, were provided for the Turkish Brigade. It was recommended that ration shipments from the ZI be balanced for direct shipment to Korea to relieve the pressure on overcrowded port and depot facilities in Japan. An increase in the level of B rations in Japan for support of Korean operations from thirty to sixty days was recommended to the DA since it was considered necessary to have a thirty day supply available in Japan at all times. (15)

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- (12) Trans Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50. (Annex 25)
 - (13) G-4 Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50. (Annex 5)
 - (14) G-4 Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50. (Annex 5)
 - (15) QM Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50. (Annex 21)

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strained Yokohama storage facilities, emphasizing the need for dispersed storage locations. A constant flow of equipment from production through depots to field use, with storage kept at a minimum, would be desirable. At the end of a supply line, such as the Far East, it is somewhat difficult to keep a depot reservoir of stocks low since the items must be on hand when needed. (16)

An initial assessment of the value of sniperscopes in the Korean action was compiled in response to a request from the DA. The information was considered incomplete due to the rapidity of collection in Eighth Army and X Corps zones and investigation was continuing. Of the total sniperscopes in FEC, 44 were in depot stock and the remainder in combat divisions, including 241 in use by ROK troops. Numerous objections were raised by individual divisions using the sniperscopes. One division reported successful use **only** in detecting enemy infiltration at night for limited ranges. Two divisions indicated they were suitable only for perimeter defense. Extensive use of the weapon was not possible due to maintenance difficulties. Required frequent recharging of batteries in many cases prevented use on outlying mountain peaks and other critical terrain features. Weight and bulk of the sniperscope further restricted its use in the mountainous Korean terrain. Use of the weapon was limited further by its short range (maximum sixty to eighty yards under ideal conditions), the difficulty of distinguishing friend from foe and the fact that the shape of a man blended in with the background terrain, particularly in mountainous areas. (17)

Responsibility for airborne logistical support and supply of air delivery equipment for the Army was transferred from FEAF to JLC as a JC responsibility in November. JC was called upon to

(16) Eng Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50. (Annex 13)

(17) Rad C 29634 CINCPAC to DA (S) 23 Nov 50. (G-3 Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50, J 50 (S) 23 Nov 50. (Annex 4)

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furnish aerial resupply of medical supplies, guns, ammunition, food and gasoline to isolated ground troops and Army airborne troops. (18)

Revised procedures on stock accounting and stock status provided for timely submission of reports from Korea by courier to the Tokyo QM Depot where stock balance cards were maintained to show theater stock status on a monthly basis. Printed forms prepared in Tokyo reduced reporting procedures to a minimum, requiring only pencil entries in indicated columns. Electric accounting machine facilities at the Tokyo QM Depot further reduced the workload of report preparation by QM installations in Korea. Studies were planned of issue slips to determine replacement factors, consumption rates and the extent to which US Army support of other UN Forces was necessary. (19) The problem of accounting and reporting logistical support by the US or foreign nations participating in the Korean war continued to be most difficult in combat areas. (20)

An interim assessment of the Korean campaign in response to a DA request for information to present to Congress indicated that any conclusions concerning logistics would have to be tempered by consideration of the situation of Japan with respect to the combat zone; its geographical location and logistical potential, a distinct and possibly a decisive factor in favor of the US Army, presented a distinct advantage not usually available in times of war. A further item to be considered was the fact that the enemy had not affected UN lines of communication materially by either air or naval action during the period of activity. The growing dependence upon air for transportation of personnel and material became increasingly evident in the Korean campaign. Little opportunity

(18) QM Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50. (Annex 21)

(19) QM Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50. (Annex 21)

(20) Office of Comptroller GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50. (Annex 12)

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presented itself for testing the value of new weapons, ammunition or vehicles. Such items as the 3.5 rocket launcher and the M-46 tank, modifications of World War II models, were shown to be marked improvements over their predecessors and were highly successful in defeating the enemy. The campaign proved that, despite the unsuitability of Korean terrain for tank warfare, tanks were still essential to balanced combat teams and no counter-weapon had as yet appeared in quantity to justify the concept that armor was obsolescent. (21)

(21) Rad C 69898 CINCPAC to DEPTAR (S) 27 Nov 50. (G-3 GHQ PAC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50, J 48 (S) 28 Nov 50) (Annex 4)

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Chapter VI

MISCELLANEOUS FEC ACTIVITIES

Certain activities under the control of FEC, although having no immediate bearing on combat operations in Korea, still may be considered significant in the over-all scheme. A few of the more important items not closely connected with the Korean conflict and yet not to be disregarded entirely in the monthly coverage of command actions included plans for Korea's future, civilian relief in Korea, problems concerning the Ryukyus Islands and the Japanese National Police Reserve (JNPR).

With the collapse of the North Korean Peoples Army the probability of a UN occupation for North Korea prior to establishment of a civil government made the formulation of plans for rehabilitation, relief and unification of the peninsula under a democratically selected government quite paramount. Plans for a unified civil government were under way. (1) The policy with reference to currency for use in liberated North Korea was in the formative stage. Currency, based on use of the ROK whan, required establishment of an equitable rate of exchange between the North Korean and ROK whan, possibly at the rate of three North Korean to one ROK whan. (2) The US Army was assigned responsibility for supply of direct civilian relief and provision of other needed supplies common to military and civilian use. (3) The trend of operations in Korea with the advent of the CCF was expected to alter or suspend completely previous CM plans for over-all civilian relief. Initial estimates set the cost at over \$17,000,000 for North Korea and \$38,000,000 for

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- (1) G-1 Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50. (Annex 2)
 - (2) Office of the Comptroller, GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50. (Annex 12)
 - (3) G-4 Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50. (Annex 5)

South Korea. (4) A survey made in South Korea to determine war damage indicated a rehabilitation cost of over \$200,000,000 with related costs raising the total to over \$300,000,000. (5)

Procedures were established partially for the handling of cases involving crimes committed against UN Forces during the Korean conflict. One of these required a monthly report from Eighth Army covering war crimes statistics. Interviews were accomplished with thirty-three recovered American PW's in Tokyo and statements taken from those having information as to offenses against the laws and customs of war. (6)

Activities at Kim Il Sung Medical College and Bacterial Institute in Pyongyang were revealed by an investigation to be connected with normal medical research. A stock of chlorpicrin gas located at a warehouse in Inchon was found to be intended for medical and agricultural use and was dumped into the sea. Investigation of liquid-filled drums with Russian markings discovered near Seoul revealed their contents to be chlorosulfonic acid, similar to the FS smoke mixture used by US military forces. (7)

Problems concerning the Ryukyus Islands continued to be a FEC responsibility. A new JCS directive established the northern boundary of the Ryukyus one degree farther south than the current boundary. FEC recommended that implementation of this new boundary be held up until a more favorable time to avoid diplomatic repercussions. (8) An effort was made to transfer large quantities of scrap accumulated in RYCOM to the Ryukyuan Government without charge for sale to Japan. The Ryukyuan yen thus accumulated was to be credited to Ryukyuan economy. This request was refused by the

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- (4) CM Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50. (Annex 21)
 - (5) G-4 Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50. (Annex 5)
 - (6) Judge Advocate Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50. (Annex 16)
 - (7) Chem Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50. (Annex 10)
 - (8) Ryukyuan Mil Govt Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50. (Annex 22)

DA on the basis that all scrap must be disposed of in accordance with standard regulations and the proceeds deposited in the US Treasury. (9) The deployment of US combat forces from Okinawa to Korea resulted in recommendations for the establishment of a Ryukyuan Constabulary along US military lines with an aggregate strength of about 2,000. Simultaneously a series of messages concerning infiltration by subversive agents and smuggling activities into and through the Ryukyus prompted CINCFE to investigate the feasibility of establishing a Ryukyuan Coast Guard. An interim solution involving the use of US Navy escort vessels to perform Ryukyuan coast guarding functions had not been put into effect as of 30 November due to the gravity of the Korean situation which required the presence of naval escort vessels elsewhere. The establishment of a Ryukyuan Constabulary and Coast Guard was approved in principle by JCS, pending receipt of detailed CINCFE recommendations. At the end of the month policy guidance on the organization to be achieved was still being formulated. (10)

The projected deployment of the bulk of US combat ground forces from Japan to Korea resulted on 8 July in an authorization for the Japanese Government to establish a National Police Reserve of 75,000 men and to expand from 10,000 to 18,000 the authorized strength of Maritime Safety Board personnel. (11) The NPR was established on 10 August with recruiting and induction virtually completed four days later. The Northern Command, Yokohama Command and Southwestern Command, set up under FEC to take over areas formerly under 7th Infantry, 1st Cavalry and 24th and 25th Infantry Divisions respectively, provided controlling headquarters for utilization of

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- (9) G-4 Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50. (Annex 5)
 (10) G-3 Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt (TS) Nov 50. (Annex 4)
 (11) G-3 was assigned responsibility for providing guidance on the initial deployment and subsequent utilization of the NPR. JLC was assigned responsibility for preparation of plans and employment of the NPR in emergencies.

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NPR units in an emergency. Several thousand NPR personnel were moved during November from occupation installations into permanent installations available to the Japanese Government to make room for projected redeployment of US troops from Korea to Japan. (12)

In line with FEC responsibilities in the Orient, plans were in progress for shipment of items to French Indo-China under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program to support the French and Vietnamese in their efforts to combat Communist Viet-Minh forces. (13)

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- (12) G-3 Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50. (Annex 4)
(13) G-4 Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50. (Annex 5)

Chapter VII

PROBLEMS, SOLUTIONS, LESSONS

In peace or war, commanders are continually faced with problems covering all phases of operations, frequently forcing make-shift methods, novel innovations and rapid adjustments to meet the exigencies of varying situations. In a constantly shifting battle procedures must be devised on the spot for handling a variety of problems generally unpredictable in long-range plans. This was particularly true in the Korean conflict where troops from several nations had to be clothed, fed, equipped and integrated into a coordinated group capable of thwarting enemy tactics in addition to overcoming the countless weather, terrain and other difficulties common to the peninsula. Improvements in operating systems to reduce or eliminate unnecessary workloads, particularly in combat areas, remained under study.

The approach of severe winter weather coupled with the rapid advance of UN Forces into the low temperature area of North Korea emphasized the immediate need for cold weather protection of personnel and equipment. The best cold weather clothing and troop indoctrination in protective measures was considered as the best method of troop survival without severe casualties. Indoctrination and demonstration teams were sent to combat areas to assist in the cold weather clothing program and help in prevention of cold weather injuries to troops of all participating UN Forces. These teams were to assist in acquisition of all required items by combat personnel and to see that clothing and equipment was properly fitted to the individual. Instruction was given to over 3,000 officers and 10,600 enlisted men during the period 20 September to 1 December. Japanese manufacturers developed arctic uniforms for the ROK Army by using cocoon waste and floss silk for insulation bats and special

paper as a wind breaker. (1)

Plans were revised for use of cold weather diesel fuel with pour point of minus 15°F due to better weather intelligence on Korea. A study of arctic grade lubricants, developed for use only under arctic conditions and constant temperatures below minus 20°F, revealed that they would not be a satisfactory substitute for regular grade lubricants when used under the warmer climatic conditions of Korea. (2)

A UN problem for which no adequate regulations existed arose in connection with scrap and salvage generated in Korea by the armed forces of several nations and generally unidentifiable. A proposal to transfer this to an appropriate private agency for use in relief, rehabilitation and prevention of disease and unrest in Korea was refused by DA on the basis that it must be handled under existing DA regulations. The problem remained unsolved. (3)

Emphasis on the Engineer Equipment Rebuild Program remained in support of Korean combat operations. Unserviceable equipment was moved from areas under Ryukyuan Command (RYCOM) and Marianas-Bonins Command (MARBO) to provide stocks for this program. Negotiations also were under way for recovering approximately 2,500 tons of unserviceable equipment on Saipan. Diversion of JLC Equipment rebuild capacity from Okinawa to support this program set the Okinawan construction program back approximately 60 days. (4)

Disposition instructions were issued on excess property located at MARBO. Excessing procedures offered additional savings in providing much needed supplies from readily available sources, provided savings in new procurement and manufacture and reduced the cost of care, handling, storage space and transportation. (5)

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- (1) QM Sec GHQ FLC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50. (Annex 21)
 - (2) G-4 Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50. (Annex 5)
 - (3) G-4 Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50. (Annex 5)
 - (4) Eng Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50. (Annex 13)
 - (5) Eng Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50. (Annex 13)

A physical inventory of US World War II property in the Palau Islands, over 76 percent of which was engineering, revealed that engineer mechanical equipment in tropical climates must be cleaned regularly and protected by proper application of paint or other protective coating. Storage of non-mechanical items must be in covered locations insofar as possible. Original processing preserves precision parts with heavy grease a suitable substitute for protecting precision surfaces adequately. (6)

Substitutes for nylon parachutes and rigging equipment for airdrop of heavy materiel were being developed for testing in Japan to replenish stocks becoming rapidly depleted due to unprecedented demands for air dropped resupply in Korea. (7)

Signal Corps devised several methods for overcoming problems arising in Japan and Korea. Plans were under way for setting up new VHF radio transmitter sites in Korea to back up wire and cable lines which were difficult to maintain on the narrow road system where heavy traffic was constantly cutting the wires. A simplified antenna field engineered at GHQ Tactical Command Post in Tokyo was expected to expedite completion of the project. High priority was given to development of a low frequency transmitter station at Funabashi (Japan) to handle traffic to the US when short wave transmission was poor; estimated completion date was set for 15 February 1951. A guard zone was established for aircraft radio navigation frequencies to decrease the possibility of aircraft accidents. (8)

Processing procedures for film taken in Korea required that all film except that necessary for tactical, identification or intelligence purposes was to be sent to GHQ Signal Section Photographic Laboratory in Tokyo for development and printing. Facilities in Tokyo were of the highest caliber while field work with inadequate

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- (6) Eng Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50. (Annex 13)
 - (7) QM Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50. (Annex 21)
 - (8) Sig Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50. (Annex 23)

facilities often resulted in poor results and possible complete loss of valuable shots: (9)

Problems in the Medical Field were varied. Treatment of casualties continued to be a major surgical activity. The necessity for wide anatomical exposure of wounds in initial surgery at hospitals in forward areas was stressed, since proper wound debridement would lessen the amount of infection and speed the process of wound healing. Exploration of the abdomen was encouraged to lessen instances of peritonitis in cases of possible visceral damage from missile wounds to the abdomen. The Preventive Medicine Consultant recommended a typhus control program for application in infected areas in northeastern Korea, calling for isolation of individual cases, mass delousing of personnel at strategic points in infected municipalities and vaccination. (10)

Difficulties in graves registration operations were threefold: shortage of personnel to form needed searching parties; terrain; and lack of trained clerks and identification personnel. A QM Graves Registration Company, less one platoon, was sent to Korea with the fourth platoon to be activated in Korea as personnel became available from the replacement stream. This alleviated the first problem to some extent. The second could be remedied by acquisition of sufficient helicopters to recover bodies from difficult and otherwise inaccessible terrain. (11) Only forty-six of the eighty-three helicopters requested by FEC were allocated, the total DA supply capability for 1950. (12) The third difficulty could be remedied by improving the present T/O&E for QM Graves Registration Companies. At least one trained medical man is required in each section to accomplish identification--a vitally important

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- (9) Sig Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50. (Annex 23)
 - (10) Med Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50. (Annex 17)
 - (11) QM Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50. (Annex 21)
 - (12) G-4 Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50. (Annex 5)

factor in graves registration operations. (13)

Two plans were under consideration for handling technical intelligence: a Technical Intelligence Center under G-2 with teams operating under its control; and the current arrangement with the addition of a Joint Technical Intelligence Branch under G-2. This branch would have the primary mission of final analysis and evaluation of all technical intelligence information in FEC. Chemical Section approved the latter plan which would give the section continued control over Chemical Corps field technical agencies. (14) Signal Section did not concur in the G-2 plan for consolidation of all technical intelligence services since such would hinder requirements for information concerning enemy equipment needed by each service and would render no additional help to tactical units. (15)

It was worthy of note that the Korean conflict was fought with minimum incidence of disorder. Commanders of component forces of the several participating nations were empowered under the laws of parent nations to appoint military tribunals to assume jurisdiction over members of their forces. This proved a most effective means of disciplinary control. Military Police of one nation were authorized to apprehend members of another nation with the understanding that such members would be turned over to forces of the parent nation for disposition as soon as possible; this did not apply to ROK Army Military Police. Whenever possible combined Military Police patrols were formed of the several component forces in an area. (16)

The linguist shortage in the theater was somewhat alleviated by several innovations. Advance interrogation teams in Korea partly solved the problem by orienting North Korean prisoners of war as

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- (13) G-1 Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50. (Annex 21)
 - (14) Chem Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50. (Annex 10)
 - (15) Sig Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50. (Annex 23)
 - (16) G-1 Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50. (Annex 2)

to information required and letting them handle the questioning of the remainder of the group. This speeded up the screening of thousands of PW's taken during late October. Captured Chinese Communist troops were interrogated in Korea through the medium of questions written in Kanji, capitalizing on the basic relationship between the Japanese and Chinese languages; this slow process was the one means of interrogation available under the circumstances. A third method was possible due to the general knowledge of Japanese by nearly all Koreans. This involved a three-way translation from Korean to Japanese to English which enabled the use of Japanese linguists to fill in the shortage of personnel with a knowledge of Korean. (17)

In a qualified interim assessment of the Korean campaign at the request of DA it was concluded that the tactical doctrine of the Army and current T/O&E had proven sound and practicable. Early reverses were considered as due primarily to lack of balanced forces on the battlefield required to implement the doctrine. As balanced forces became available in sufficient quantities our doctrine of offensive maneuver brought success despite unorthodox enemy tactics. Lessons of the closing phases of world war II relating to close air and naval support of ground forces were reiterated, emphasizing the fact that success of joint operations is largely dependent upon the availability of balanced forces. The Korean campaign pointed out inadequacies in our peacetime training, particularly with respect to mental and physical preparation of soldiers to meet the realities of combat. A volunteer Army is not large enough to meet our commitments during the current international situation and the Army we do maintain must be hardened to the actualities of combat. (18)

 (17) G-2 Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50. (Annex 3)

(18) Rad C 69898 (S) CINCPAC to DEPTAR, 27 Nov 50. (G-3 Sec GHQ FEC/UNC Staff Sec Rpt Nov 50, J 48 (S) 28 Nov 50) (Annex 4)